Last week, Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan announced that he had decided to give up the distinction of being the largest banking company in America by reducing the firm’s size from $2.3 trillion to $1.7 trillion in assets. What makes this story so amazing is that Moynihan’s two predecessors, Ken Lewis and Hugh McColl, had spent the past two decades growing what was then known as Nationsbank (and even earlier as North Carolina National Bank) from a southern regional bank into the title of America’s largest bank.
McColl and Lewis, however, were not alone. The CEOs of most large banks had pursued the same title over the past 20 years. In 1991, the largest banking company in the U.S. was Citicorp, with about $220 billion in assets; today it is Bank of America, with about $2.5 trillion in assets. This pursuit of size also has resulted in an industry dominated by four trillion-dollar firms: BofA, Citi, JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo. Together, these four companies control about half of the industry’s assets, whereas twenty years ago, the four largest banks controlled less than ten percent of industry assets. Today there are about 7,000 banks; in 1991, there were almost twice that number. Most of the difference is the result of mergers, as the biggest banks gobbled up their smaller rivals and increased their size by an order of magnitude.
This raises two related questions: Why do banking CEOs prize size so highly; and why is Moynihan taking BofA in the other direction? The answer to the first question requires us to examine the governance structure of the modern American corporation; the answer to the second requires us to see what makes BofA different from its competitors.
In corporate America, a company’s leader is its CEO. The CEO, after consulting her board of directors, makes the most important strategic decisions, such as in which assets to invest and how to finance those assets. The board of directors, whose members are elected by and represent the company’s shareholders, have the job of hiring, compensating, monitoring, and, if necessary, firing the CEO.
Many observers of corporate America, including this professor, would argue that this system of governance is broken, in that the board of directors has been co-opted by the CEO, who typically also serves as the Chairman of the Board of Directors, a position that enables her to set the agenda of board meetings. The CEO also often chairs the board’s nominating committee, which selects prospective new board members. In conjunction with her management team, known as “inside” board members, the CEO typically has more votes than independent, or “outside,” board members. Hence, the CEO is able to control the board rather than the board controlling the CEO. This includes such critical duties as setting compensation, which provides the CEO with incentives to invest in certain assets and finance those investments with certain types of funds.
What has happened in most industries, including banking, is that boards have turned to consultants for guidance on setting compensation. Those consultants typically recommend tying a CEO’s compensation to what is paid by other companies in the same industry and of comparable size, where size is typically measured by annual revenues. Hence, we see CEOs pursuing growth of revenues above all else and often without regard to levels of risk.
A national franchise also means national political clout. Bank of America has branches in almost every Congressional district, giving it access to virtually every single member of the U.S. Congress.
In banking, there is yet a third reason to grow so large. When the solvency of a bank threatens the entire financial system, it is said to be “too big to fail,” or TBTF. Once a bank becomes TBTF, it can pursue reckless high-risk investment strategies, knowing that it can privatize any gains, but will be able to socialize the losses through a taxpayer bailout. This is exactly what happened back in 2008 when Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson asked for $800 billion to bail out the TBTF banks.
So what makes BofA different from its competitors, who continue to grow? The answer can be summarized in one word: Countrywide. In his quest for the title of the “biggest,” Ken Lewis entered into what will most probably be known as the most disastrous acquisition in the history of corporate America. Countrywide was ground zero of the subprime-mortgage debacle, lending more than a trillion dollars to just about anyone with a pulse, and then selling most (but not all) of these mortgages to investors with promises that they were triple-A investments. We now know that these promises were false; a huge percentage of these mortgages have gone into default, resulting in tens, if not hundreds, of billions in losses. BofA inherited most of its bad loans from Countrywide and most of the investors now suing BofA for fraud suffered losses from mortgages originated by Countrywide.
While not much can be done to save BofA, we can make changes to reduce the likelihood of another financial meltdown like 2008. The first of these reforms would be to limit banking companies to banking activities, forcing them to divest their investment banking activities. This was a depression-era reform known as the Glass-Steagall Act, one that was abandoned during the late 1990s. This reform alone would cut the size of the largest banks by almost half. That said, half of 2 trillion is still too big. The only way to eliminate TBTF is to limit the size of banks. There is no reason why banks need to be larger than was Citicorp back in 1991 at $220 billion; such a limit is eminently reasonable and would limit future taxpayer losses.
The second of these reforms would be a series of changes to corporate governance. To limit the ability of the CEO to co-opt her Board of Directors, we should prohibit a CEO from simultaneously serving as Chairman of the Board; and from simultaneously chairing any board committee, especially the nominating committee. To limit the aggregate board control of insiders, we should require that a majority of all boards be composed of so-called “outside” directors, i.e., directors who don’t also serve as members of the management teams. Finally, tying CEO compensation more closely to long-term performance, especially long-run stock returns, instead of to annual revenues, would reduce incentives for pursuing high-risk investments.
With these two sets of reforms, we could fundamentally change the governance of U.S. corporations in ways that reduce the separation of ownership from control, restoring control to the shareholders that actually “own” the firm; and limit the potential taxpayer liabilities from the next financial crisis, which, under the current system, always seems to be just around the corner.
NOTE: An edited version of this blog appeared Sep. 20 in the Washington Post’s new “OnLeadership” blog.